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Abstract Fatalism has been shown to predict several health
behaviors, but researchers often find inconsistent results for
the same behaviors across studies. This may be partially at-
tributable to the diversity of fatalism measures that have been
used in previous studies. A review of the literature revealed 51
different scales, all purported to measure fatalism, but often
with heterogeneous content (Esparza 2005). A study done by
Esparza (2005) retrieved 29 scales, including the most fre-
quently used scales, and performed an exploratory factor anal-
ysis, obtaining as a result five factors: fatalism, helplessness,
internality, luck, and divine control. The purpose of this study
was to develop a multidimensional fatalism scale based on the
previous findings by Esparza (2005). This scale was devel-
oped simultaneously in English and Spanish in order to lin-
guistically “decenter” item content. The factor structure was
cross-validated and measurement invariance was assessed
across language versions. According to the measurement in-
variance analysis, this test is invariant across English and
Spanish in its factor structure, loadings, variances, and covari-
ances. This study results suggest that this scale may be used
interchangeably in both English and Spanish.
Keywords Fatalism .Measurement invariance . Factor
analysis
Fatalism has been a construct of increasing interest in person-
ality and health psychology over the past thirty years. A
literature review performed with the PsycINFO database
using the term “fatalism” returned 80 published studies from
1985 to 1994, 169 studies from 1995 to 2004, and 334 studies
from 2005 to 2014. However, in this extensive body of work,
fatalism has been defined and operationalized in many differ-
ent ways. For example, it has been defined as the belief that
outcomes are predetermined by external forces (Ross et al.
1983). Futa et al. (2001) defined it as the acceptance of one’s
situation. Fatalism has also been interpreted as a potentially
adaptive response to uncontrollable life situations experienced
by minorities (Parker and Kleiner 1966). Wheaton (1983)
stated that fatalism is a tendency to believe in the efficacy of
environmental rather than personal forces in understanding
the causes of life outcomes, including both “success” and
“failure” outcomes. Scheier and Bridges (1995) focused on
the pessimistic aspect of fatalism, claiming that fatalism and
pessimism share a common core that involves negative expec-
tations regarding future outcomes. According to these defini-
tions, fatalism has been variously characterized as external
locus of control, belief in predetermination, acceptance of re-
ality, or a coping skill. While the term has been usually im-
bued with negative connotations, there have been at least
some definitions that suggest a positive perspective.
Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary (1993) defined fa-
talism as “the doctrine that all events are subject to fate or
inevitable predetermination; the acceptance of all things and
events as inevitable; submission to fate” (p. 517). However,
there has not been a comprehensive theory of fatalism in the
psychology literature. In an initial effort to identify some
structure in the field, Acevedo (2005a) reviewed several find-
ings regarding fatalism. He noted that from the sociological
perspective, fatalism could be viewed in the context of theo-
ries by Durkheim andMarx (Acevedo 2005b) who focused on
the over-regulation by social structures, though Acevedo
(2005a) also proposed a fatalism theory that included a
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cognitive factor. He held that fatalism could be the result of
social structures, like slavery, but it could also be a cognitive
orientation in people.
Acevedo (2005a) distinguished between two types of fatal-
ism: structural and cosmological. Structural fatalism was de-
fined as “a sense of powerlessness that results from a combi-
nation of over regulation combined with a lack of exit option
into the collective body in which the subject lacks the neces-
sary voice and/or exit option to alter their social position,
status, rank, or living conditions” (Acevedo 2005a, p. 75).
Structural fatalism could result from feeling powerless due
to social structures, like slavery or poverty, which overregulate
the lives of people, but structural fatalism could also involve
powerlessness due to a perceived lack of self-efficacy, which
has been associated with lack of control or mastery (Acevedo
2005a). Cosmological fatalism was defined as “the extent to
which a given individual or collective group grants control
and decision making authority over life’s outcomes to cosmo-
logical or metaphysical powers” (Acevedo 2005a, p. 73).
Most frequently, this type of fatalism has involved a voluntary
resignation of aspects of one’s life to divine control. Cosmo-
logical fatalism has involved “internalization” of one’s fate,
while structural fatalism has only involved “acceptance,” rath-
er than internalization of fate. Acevedo emphasized that the
types of fatalism he described are different, but not mutually
exclusive.
Acevedo’s two types of fatalism parallel, to some extent,
work on secondary control, initially outlined by Rothbaum
et al. (1982), and more recently reviewed and refined by
Morling and Evered (2006). Morling and Evered defined sec-
ondary control as “…adjust[ing] some aspect of the self and
accept[ing] circumstances as they are” (2006, p. 272). They
distinguished between “adjustment” of the self to improve fit
with environmental circumstances (a term closely related to
Acevedo’s concept of “internalization”), and mere “accep-
tance” of events, suggesting that both characteristics were
necessary to achieve secondary control. Thus, it would seem
that Acevedo’s conceptualization of fatalism included second-
ary control expectations, but focused primarily on acceptance
of current and future circumstances, without requiring that
adjustment or internalization took place. While Acevedo’s
work has begun to outline important theoretical distinctions
in the area of fatalism, the area has remained largely undirect-
ed by theory, with many researchers using various, and often
little-overlapping, measures to assess what they term
“fatalism.”
Different Fatalism Scales
A literature search done by Esparza (2005), using the
PsychInfo database and the search terms “fatalistic” and “fa-
talism,” revealed 51 different scales, all explicitly purported
by researchers to measure fatalism. Some scales were used
quite often, like Rotter’s Internal-External Locus of Control
Scale (Rotter 1966), but other scales were constructed and
used only for a single study. In addition, some researchers
have simply used measures of other constructs as proxies for
fatalism. Many researchers have measured fatalism as locus of
control (e.g., Joiner et al. 2001; Schedlowski et al. 1995;Wade
1996). Fatalism has been conceptualized as a coping skill in
different scales (e.g., Akechi et al. 2001; Classen et al. 1996;
Moneyham et al. 1997). Measures of mastery have included
fatalism in their subscales (e.g., Green and Rodgers 2002;
Neff 1993; Pearlin and Schooler 1978). Other scales and arti-
cles have equated fatalism with learned helplessness (Clarke
et al. 1982), lack of activism (Chandler 1979; Farris and Glenn
1976), world views (Goodwin et al. 1999; Peck 1981), facets
of personality (Wheaton 1983), belief in a just world (Lipkus
1991), perceptions and attitudes about safety (Rudomo and
Hale 2003; Williamson et al. 1997), cultural values or con-
structs (Cuéllar et al. 1995a; b; Sanchez and Garriga 1996),
pessimism (Scheier and Bridges 1995), death threat (Moore
and Neimeyer 1991), and views and expectations for the fu-
ture (De Brabander et al. 1999; Somlai et al. 2000).
Recently, the most used fatalism scale has been the Powe
fatalism Inventory (Powe 1995). Several cancer studies have
used this scale (e.g., Davis et al. 2002; Dettenborn et al. 2004;
Farmer et al. 2007; Gonzalez 2007; Gorin 2005; Greiner et al.
2005; Gullatte et al. 2010; Lawsin et al. 2006; Magai et al.
2004; Mayo et al. 2001; Pines 2002; Powe et al. 2006; Russell
et al. 2006; Talbert 2007), that has assessed several compo-
nents of cancer fatalism including belief in divine control and
predetermination, pessimism, resignation, and the perceived
inevitability of death associated with a cancer diagnosis. All of
the items of this scale were related to cancer, for example “I
believe if someone gets cancer, it was meant to be”. However,
although these constructs have been described by researchers
as representing fatalism, it is unclear whether they have had
any semantic similarity. In their review of the measurement of
fatalism, Abraído-Lanza et al. (2007) mentioned that there has
been a lack of established and reliable scales, limited evidence
of the validity of existing measures and that the different
scales may have tapped different fatalism constructs, suggest-
ing a need to develop complex, valid and reliable fatalism
measures.
There have been two new fatalism scales developed recent-
ly, but they are specific to health beliefs and diabetes. Shen
et al. (2009), developed a scale in which they conceptualized
fatalism as a set of health beliefs. Their scale was composed of
20 items divided in three dimensions: predetermination, luck
and pessimism. These factors are similar to the factors
proposed in the present study but the difference is that Shen
et al. (2009) adapted all of their items to health beliefs, for
example, “I will get diseases if I am unlucky”. Egede and Ellis
(2010) developed a 12-item diabetes fatalism scale with three
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factors: emotional distress, religious and spiritual coping and
perceived self-efficacy. All of their items were related to dia-
betes, for example, “I get frustrated with having to live with
diabetes”.
Analysis of Several Fatalism Scales
In an attempt to bring order to the construct of fatalism and its
measures, Esparza (2005) did a literature search and found 51
different scales, all purported to measure fatalism. Twenty-
nine of the most commonly used scales were used to analyze
the construct. An exploratory factor analysis was performed
on 239 items that were obtained from the 29 fatalism scales.
Items loaded onto five main factors. The content of the first
factor was labeled “fatalism” because it most clearly reflected
the belief that events are fixed in advance. Examples of items
that loaded on this factor were “When something bad hap-
pens, I accept it as unavoidable,” and “If bad things happen,
it is because they were meant to be.” This factor appeared to
define the core of the fatalism construct and related more
closely than the others to the definition given by Merriam-
Webster’s collegiate dictionary (1993)—“a doctrine that
events are fixed in advance so that human beings are power-
less to change them” (p. 517).
Items from the second factor were related to perceptions of
helplessness and pessimism, and thus the factor was labeled
helplessness. Examples of items that loaded on this factor
were “Every time I try to get ahead, something or somebody
stops me,” and “I often feel helpless in dealing with the prob-
lems of life.” Items that loaded onto the third factor were all
related to expectancies of internal control over important life
events. They were all reverse coded in an effort to measure
fatalism. Examples of items that loaded on this factor were
“When I get what I want, it's usually because I worked hard
for it,” and “What happens to me in the future mostly depends
on me.” Almost all items that loaded on the fourth factor
included the words “luck” or “fortune.” Examples of items
that loaded on the fourth factor were “Luck plays a big part
in determining how soon I will recover from an illness,” and
“Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to
bad luck.” All of the items that loaded on the fifth factor
included the word “God.” Examples of items that loaded on
this factor were “Whether or not my health improves is up to
God,” and “Everything that happens is part of God's plan.”
This factor, dubbed “divine control,” was highly internally
consistent. Finally, there were 108 items that did not load on
any of the five factors, for example “Whenever I don’t feel
well, I should consult a medically trained professional” and
“I’ve had a good life, what’s left is a bonus.”
Items from these scales did not measure a single fatalism
construct but rather five different, but correlated, factors. The
lowest correlations were between the factors of helplessness
and divine control (r=0.05), the factors of externality and
divine control (r=0.10), the factors of luck and divine control
(r=0.20), and the factors of ineluctable destiny and externality
(r=0.27). The highest correlation was between the factors of
ineluctable destiny and helplessness (r=0.48). The divine
control factor had small correlations with most of the other
scales. In addition, many items did not load on the five factors.
The findings suggested a need to elaborate a fatalism instru-
ment that brings unity in its measure. This type of scale would
help us advance the understanding of the construct of fatalism
and its relationships to other variables.
The Present Study
The present study was undertaken to develop a new multidi-
mensional measure of fatalism and related constructs in-
formed by Esparza (2005). In the development of new instru-
ments there is a risk of ethnocentric bias that may threaten
cross-cultural validity (Tanzer 2005). The term “centering”
refers to the origination of a scale in one language and
culture, embedding it in that linguistic and cultural context
to an extent that it is difficult or inappropriate to transfer the
scale to a new context. Tanzer (2005) pleads for simultaneous
development of scales to maximize cultural and linguistic
“decentering,” in an attempt to reduce biases across cultures
from the beginning. The process of simultaneous development
involves constructing items for a scale in two languages at the
same time. Because of the likelihood that a new fatalism mea-
sure would be used in cross-cultural and multilingual research,
a simultaneous development approach was used in the current
study, and measurement invariance analyses were employed
to assess the equivalence of the two versions of the instrument.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 791 participants recruited from Intro-
duction to Psychology classes at the University of Texas at El
Paso. Participants were 64.6 % females and 35.4 % males,
with a mean age of 20.34 (σ=4.65). Most of the sample was
Hispanic (86.2 %), with non-Hispanic White participants
making up 7.5 % of the sample. In regard to marital status,
90.5 % were single and 7 % were married or living with a
romantic partner. The mean socioeconomic status for the head
of household, measured by the two-factor Hollingshead socio-
economic status index, was 42.58, which reflects a social stra-
tum comprising medium business, minor professional, and
technical workers (Hollingshead 1965). The sample was di-
vided randomly into two subsamples: One of the subsamples
was used for the exploratory factor analysis (n=400) and the
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second subsample for the confirmatory factor analysis
(n=391). There were 513 participants who answered the fa-
talism items in English during the first administration and 278
in Spanish.
In discussing power analyses for factor analysis,
MacCallum et al. (1999) note that sample size should be re-
lated to item communalities, number of factors, and number of
items per factor. MacCallum et al. (1999) suggest that “if
results show a relatively small number of factors and moderate
to high communalities, then the investigator can be confident
that obtained factors represent a close match to population
factors, even with moderate to small sample sizes” (p. 97).
In this study, communalities for the exploratory factor analysis
ranged from 0.63 to 0.90 and the items were written to load on
the expected factors.
Materials
Demographics Participants were asked about their age, gen-
der, ethnicity, and proficiency in English and Spanish.
Two-Factor Hollingshead Socioeconomic Status Index
This index is typically computed from occupation and educa-
tion of the participant (Hollingshead 1965). However, because
participants in this study were students, they were asked to
provide the information on the current head of their house-
hold. Hollingshead (1975) reported that the two factors
accounted for 98 % of the variance in sociologist’s ratings of
social status, suggesting that the index has adequate construct
and content validity. Hollingshead ratings were completed by
a rater (the first author) who was trained to an inter-rater reli-
ability correlation of r=0.98. Scores ranged from 11 to 77,
with smaller scores corresponding to higher socioeconomic
status.
Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans II
(ARSMA-II) This instrument measures the construct of ac-
culturation to the Mexican and the Anglo cultures. The
ARSMA-II contains two independent scales that measure
Mexican Orientation and Anglo Orientation separately. The
Mexican Orientation Subscale (MOS) is composed of 17
items and the Anglo Orientation Subscale (AOS) is composed
of 13 items that are answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from “Almost Always/Extremely Often” to “Not at all.”
Higher scores on the subscales mean greater identification
with the culture each is measuring. The MOS has an internal
consistency score of α=0.88 and the AOS has an internal
consistency of α=0.83 (Cuéllar et al. 1995a; b).
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) The Attributional
Style Questionnaire was developed to assess dispositional at-
tributions hypothesized to lead to learned helplessness and
depressed mood (Peterson et al. 1982). The ASQ measures
three dimensions: Internality, Stability, and Globality. For pur-
poses of this study, only the Internality dimension was used to
analyze its relationship with the internality factor of our fatal-
ism scale. Higher scores are related to more internal locus.
Although widely used by researchers in the past, the internal-
ity scale has the lowest internal reliability of the three dimen-
sions, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.50 for positive events and
0.46 for negative events (Peterson et al. 1982).
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL) This measure reflects a
belief in a stable and personal good fortune, distinct from the
concepts of optimism, self-esteem, or locus of control (Darke
and Freedman 1997). The instrument is composed of 12 items
with a five-point Likert type response scale ranging from
“Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (5). Higher
scores mean participants believe more strongly that life has
been good to them—that they have good luck. The internal
consistency of this scale is α=0.85, and the 1–2 month test-
retest reliability is r=0.63 (Darke and Freedman 1997).
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) This is a self-report
measure from the Prime-MD (Spitzer et al. 1994) that consists
of nine items assessing self-report depressive symptoms from
the DSM-IV from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day). Ac-
cording to the authors, PHQ-9 scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20
represented mild, moderate, moderately severe, and severe
depression, respectively. The reported internal reliability
(alpha) of the PHQ-9 has ranged from 0.86 to 0.89 (Kroenke
et al. 2001).
Life Orientation Test- Revised (LOT-R) This instrument
measures optimism for the future. This is a six-item measure
with four filler items. Higher values imply optimism. The
answer format is a five-point Likert type scale ranging from
“I agree a lot” (1), to “I disagree a lot” (5). Its Cronbach alpha
is 0.82 (Scheier and Carver 1992) and its 28-month test-retest
reliability is r=0.79 (Scheier et al. 1994).
Duke Religion Index (DRI) This is a five-item instrument of
religiosity with internal consistency of α=0.91 (Storch et al.
2004). The scale was developed to assess beliefs, practices,
and personal devotions.
Design and Procedure
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
for Human Subjects at UTEP. Participants rendered informed
consent, and group seating and data collection efforts were
structured to maximize confidentiality and anonymity of re-
sponses. For the first phase, items were generated in English
and Spanish using the simultaneous development approach
proposed by Tanzer (2005). This procedure involves a “com-
mittee approach” which includes bilingual people with the
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experience of both cultures and with experience in mainstream
psychology, psychometrics, test construction techniques, cul-
tural psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and linguistics
(Tanzer 2005). When items are written in two languages si-
multaneously, idioms specific to one language or culture are
generally avoided, leading to decentering of the measure and
easier translation to other linguistic and cultural contexts.
For the second phase of the study, an empirical item selec-
tion approach was applied. Exploratory factor analysis was
used to test the hypothesized factor structure and obtain the
items with the highest loadings on each of the factors. Once
items were selected, the factor structure was cross-validated
through a confirmatory factor analysis with a second sample.
The confirmatory factor analysis assessedmodel fit of the new
multidimensional fatalism measure.
The third step was to analyze measurement invariance and
structural invariance across the English and Spanish versions
of the fatalism measure (Byrne et al. 1989). Measurement
invariance included invariance of factor loadings, regression
intercepts, and error/uniqueness variances, while structural in-
variances included invariance of factor variance-covariance
structures and factor means (Byrne et al. 1989).
Convergent and discriminant validities were assessed in the
fourth phase. From literature review, a list of brief and well-
establishedmeasures conceptually associatedwith the hypoth-
esized factors was obtained. Pessimism (the LOT-R) and de-
pression (the PHQ-9) were used to assess the convergent va-
lidity of the helplessness factor (Anderson 1990; Burns and
Seligman 1991; Luten et al. 1997: Peterson and Vaidya 2001).
The internal attribution subscale of the ASQ was used to as-
sess convergent validity of the internality factor The BIGL
was selected as the most conceptually similar to the luck fac-
tor. The divine control factor was paired with the Duke Reli-
gion Index. The fatalism factor has, in past research, been the
first and strongest factor from items used in other fatalism
scales; it is the factor that best reflects the core concept of
fatalism as defined by the Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dic-
tionary (1993). Since no existing measure assesses that single
factor, it was decided to only assess discriminant validity of
this factor.
Results
Item Generation and Selection
Items were elaborated by two bilingual/bicultural content ex-
perts in both English and Spanish simultaneously for each
factor of the five factors identified in the first phase. Items
were required to have a similar meaning in English and Span-
ish using a comparable vocabulary and avoiding idioms. Each
expert created a list of 20 items per factor based on the factor
definitions and sample items from the study done by Esparza
(2005). After eliminating identical items from this original list
of 40 items per factor, the fatalism factor had 31 items, the
helplessness factor had 36 items, the internality factor had 30
items, the luck factor had 37 items, and the divine control
factor had 37 items. To further reduce the number of items
(and the required sample size for factor analysis) the authors
chose the best 18 items per factor, based on face validity. Items
that addressed the construct in a broad manner were kept (e.g.,
If bad things happen to me in life, it is because of God's will),
and items with more topic- specific content were rejected
(e.g., It doesn't matter who is in political power, since it's
God's will what happens in a country). The pool of items
was then revised in both languages by a bilingual group of
graduate students and undergraduate students in psychology.
A final revision of the translations was done by a certified
translator.
The readability of the scales in English and Spanish was
analyzed. For the English form, the Flesh-Kincaid Grade Lev-
el (FKGL) value was 5.67, indicating a reading level of 5th
grade. The Flesh Reading Ease (FRE) value was 79.18, indi-
cating a reading level of a 7th grade. For the Spanish form, the
Huerta Reading Ease (HRE) index was 91.73, indicating a
reading level of 5th grade.
Two different versions (Form A and Form B) of the fatal-
ism questionnaire were generated, with items ordered random-
ly to control for order effects. Order effects were assessed
following the procedure by Panter et al. (1992). Invariance
was assessed across Form A and Form B, and no order effects
were found. The sample size for Form A was 398 and for
Form B it was 393.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
and Cross-Validation—Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Missing Data
There were missing data on the fatalism measures. Out of the
71,190 data values from the fatalism measures, 134 (0.19 %)
were missing. Since all participants answered most or all of
the items, and since the percentage of missing data was low, it
was decided to impute missing data. Data imputation was
performed using the expectation maximization algorithm
(Dempster et al. 1977) with the computer program NORM
2.03 (Schafer 2000).
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Our initial group of 862 participants was randomly divided
into two samples. The exploratory factor analysis was per-
formed with all 90 items and with a sample size of 400. Five
factors were extracted using generalized least squares with a
Promax rotation. Eigenvalues for the five factors ranged from
16.21 for the divine control factor to 2.22 for the fatalism
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factor. The percent of the variance explained by each factor
ranged from 18.01 % for the divine control factor to 2.47 %
for the fatalism factor. Items loaded on the expected factors.
Based on the factor loadings, six items per factor were selected
for scale inclusion. The selected items were those with the
highest loadings that did not have a higher loading on other
factors (Table 1). Loadings for the selected items ranged from
0.50 to 0.88 and the communalities of the selected items
ranged from 0.63 to 0.90.
Normality of Data
For the confirmatory factor analysis, normality for the data
was assessed by analyzing the ratio of the skewness statistic
and the standard error of the skewness per item (Curran et al.
1996; West et al. 1995). There were 23 skewed items, so since
our data were not normally distributed, the diagonally weight-
ed least-squares (DWLS) method was used to analyze the
models for this study. The DWLS method outperforms the
weighted least-squares (WLS) when sample sizes are limited
(Flora and Curran 2004).
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
A sample of 391 participants was used to cross-validate the
factor structure of the fatalism measure. The confirmatory factor
analysis included five factors and each factor included six items,
for a total of 30 items (Table 2). In order to calculate the model,
the variance of the itemwith the highest loading per factor had to
be constrained to one. Model fit was evaluated with the follow-
ing results: The SBχ2 with 395° freedom was equal to 647.41
(p < 0.01). The rest of the values were: NNFI = 0.97,
RMSEA= 0.04, CFI = 0.97, NFI = 0.94, GFI = 0.96, and
SRMR=0.05. Using Hu and Bentler (1999) criteria, all indices
indicate a good model fit except for the SBχ2. Loadings for this
model ranged from 0.37 to 0.87 (Table 3).
The factors were intercorrelated (see Table 4). Cronbach’s
alpha coefficients (α) indicating internal consistency of the
scales across samples were acceptable for all subscales: fatal-
ism (α=0.76), helplessness (α=0.76), internality (α=0.80),
luck (α=0.82), divine control (α=0.92). Some shrinkage was
observed upon cross-validation, as expected.
Test-Retest Reliability
One week test-retest reliability was assessed by correlating
factors scores derived from the first session with the factor
scores from the second session. Five hundred seventy-eight
participants completed the fatalism form for Time 2. The Pear-
son product–moment correlation for the fatalism factor was
r=0.71, for helplessness it was r=0.73, for internality it was
r=0.63, for luck it was r=0.77, and for divine control it was
r=0.87.
Measurement Invariance
Because the χ2 and the Δχ2 indices are sensitive to sample
size and to non-normal data (Cheung and Rensvold 2002;
Little 1997; Marsh et al. 1997), we used the difference in the
comparative fit index (ΔCFI) as an index to assess invariance
between nested models and the baseline model. A ΔCFI of
less than or equal to 0.01 suggests similar model fit (Byrne
et al. 2007; Cheung and Rensvold 2002).
Since our confirmatory factor analysis indicated a good
model fit, measurement invariance was assessed across En-
glish and Spanish. A confirmatory factor analysis was done
for each of the samples. Both the English and Spanish models
had good fit indices (Table 5). Thus, configural invariancewas
analyzed. The configural invariance model is the baseline
model to which the rest of the nested models were compared
using the ΔCFI value (Byrne et al. 2007; Cheung and
Rensvold 2002). The configural invariance model showed
good fit (Table 5), so loadings were constrained to equality
across samples (metric invariance). The model fit well and the
ΔCFI value was less than 0.01 (Table 5). Next, item intercepts
were constrained to equality (scalar invariance), and good fit
was once again observed (Table 5). Finally, the item errors
were constrained to equality (strict factorial invariance). The
ΔCFI value was less than 0.01 and all of the fit indices
(Table 5) were in the range recommended by Hu and Bentler
(1999). To test structural invariance, factor variances and co-
variances were constrained to equality across language.
Again, the model was a good fit and theΔCFI value was less
than 0.01 (Table 5).
Since the scale had strict configural invariance and struc-
tural invariance in its factor variances and covariances, it was
possible to calculate differences in factor means across the
English and Spanish samples. Following Byrne (1998), the
factor means of the English sample were permitted to vary
and the factor means of the Spanish sample were fixed at zero.
Item intercepts in the Spanish sample were also held invariant
(Byrne 1998). The analysis indicated significant differences in
the fatalism factor, the internality factor, the luck factor, and
the divine control factor and the difference estimates were
0.20, −0.14, 0.06, and 0.08, respectively. Even though the
differences are significant, each difference is less than a point
of the scale.
Convergent and Discriminant Validity
To assess convergent and discriminant validity, the fatalism
factors were correlated with the selected criterion measures.
Table 6 shows the correlation between the fatalism factors and
measures of optimism, internality, belief in good luck, depres-
sion, and religiosity. As predicted, the helplessness factor had
its highest correlations with optimism and with depression, the
luck factor had its highest correlation with belief in good luck,
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Table 1 Factor loadings and communalities for exploratory factor analysis of fatalism scale
Time Factor loadings Communality
1 2 3 4 5 h2
Divine control
Everything that happens is part of God’s plan. 0.88 −0.05 0.04 −0.15 0.33 0.90
Everything that happens to a person was planned by God. 0.85 0.02 0.08 −0.13 0.32 0.86
Whatever happens to me in my life, it is because that is the way God
wanted it to happen.
0.83 0.03 0.11 −0.15 0.39 0.83
God controls everything good and bad that happens to a person. 0.82 0.05 0.17 −0.21 0.28 0.85
God has a plan for each person, and you cannot change his plan. 0.81 −0.04 0.05 −0.13 0.40 0.84
No matter how much effort I invest into doing things, at the end, God’s
decisions will prevail.
0.80 0.00 0.13 −0.20 0.31 0.80
Luck
When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky. 0.05 0.76 0.36 −0.25 0.03 0.71
How successful people are in their job is related to how lucky they are. 0.12 0.72 0.41 −0.23 0.08 0.77
Some people are simply born being lucky. 0.06 0.71 0.27 −0.17 0.07 0.70
When good things happen to people, it is because of good luck. 0.10 0.71 0.32 −0.16 0.22 0.72
The really good things that happen to me are mostly because of luck. 0.12 0.69 0.34 −0.15 0.23 0.77
Luck does not exist 0.01 −0.67 −0.06 0.09 −0.18 0.77
Helplessness
I feel that nothing I can do will change things. 0.27 0.27 0.69 −0.48 0.20 0.73
Sometimes I feel there is nothing to look forward to in the future. 0.13 0.24 0.68 −0.33 0.15 0.73
I feel that I do not have any control over the things that happen to me. 0.30 0.27 0.64 −0.46 0.34 0.73
No matter how hard I try, I still cannot succeed in life. 0.14 0.23 0.62 −0.33 0.03 0.65
I often feel overwhelmed with problems, since I do not have any
control over solving these problems.
0.15 0.32 0.61 −0.27 0.19 0.66
There’s nothing I can do to succeed in life, since one’s level of success
is determined when one is born.
0.33 0.26 0.57 −0.31 0.09 0.68
Internality
I feel that when good things happen, they happen as a result of my own
efforts.
−0.22 −0.27 −0.37 0.70 −0.03 0.74
What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me. −0.27 −0.15 −0.33 0.68 −0.09 0.73
My life is determined by my own actions. −0.18 −0.20 −0.31 0.65 −0.03 0.65
What people get out of life is always due to the amount of effort they
put into it.
−0.07 −0.29 −0.27 0.62 0.14 0.66
What happens to me is a consequence of what I do. −0.22 −0.29 −0.28 0.62 0.00 0.67
I can do almost anything if I really want to do it. −0.11 −0.22 −0.39 0.61 0.09 0.68
Fatalism
I have learned that what is going to happen will happen. 0.46 0.22 0.29 −0.11 0.69 0.75
If something bad is going to happen to me, it will happen no matter
what I do.
0.40 0.15 0.31 −0.15 0.61 0.67
If bad things happen, it is because they were meant to happen. 0.47 0.14 0.23 −0.14 0.58 0.66
There is no sense in planning a lot; if something good is going to
happen, it will.
0.26 0.22 0.42 −0.20 0.54 0.66
Life is very unpredictable, and there is nothing one can do to
change the future.
0.26 0.09 0.32 −0.13 0.51 0.63
People die when it is their time to die and there is not much that can
be done about it.
0.32 −0.10 0.02 0.02 0.50 0.64
Other items
Only God knows, and only He will determine what will become of
our lives.
0.80 −0.01 0.14 −0.15 0.40 0.83
It doesn’t do any good to try to change the future because the future
is in the hands of God.
0.75 0.05 0.33 −0.22 0.33 0.81
God is in control of my health. 0.74 0.02 0.11 −0.21 0.18 0.77
There is nothing I can do to change the will of God. 0.73 −0.07 0.04 −0.09 0.39 0.74
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Table 1 (continued)
Time Factor loadings Communality
1 2 3 4 5 h2
God is directly responsible for my health getting better or worse. 0.72 0.16 0.26 −0.24 0.20 0.76
It doesn’t matter what I want to do with my life, since God has total
control over what happens.
0.70 0.07 0.36 −0.25 0.16 0.78
If bad things happen to me in life, it is because of God’s will. 0.70 0.16 0.27 −0.24 0.27 0.73
God will protect me from any harm. 0.67 0.04 0.04 −0.01 0.19 0.72
It really doesn’t help to plan things because everything is in God’s
hands.
0.63 0.12 0.38 −0.18 0.32 0.67
God will take care of me even if I do not take care of myself. 0.54 0.18 0.20 −0.11 0.20 0.66
There’s no sense in getting checked by the doctor since my health
depends only on God’s will.
0.41 0.24 0.35 −0.22 0.12 0.63
Trusting to faith has never worked out as well for me as taking action −0.36 0.02 0.02 0.22 −0.07 0.52
People who are lucky always get what they want out of life. 0.07 0.69 0.34 −0.11 0.00 0.73
If someone is in a position of power, it’s because he/she was born
lucky.
0.12 0.68 0.47 −0.27 −0.04 0.74
Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly caused by
bad luck.
0.01 0.60 0.35 −0.26 0.05 0.64
Accidents usually happen to people who have bad luck. 0.10 0.58 0.39 −0.21 0.04 0.63
If a person gets sick, it’s usually related to his or her bad luck. 0.11 0.57 0.47 −0.31 −0.15 0.67
I don’t believe that luck has anything to do with what happens to a
person.
0.04 −0.57 −0.09 0.13 0.09 0.71
Good luck is more important than hard work to succeed in life. 0.12 0.50 0.45 −0.29 −0.01 0.65
Becoming successful has to do with hard work; luck has little or
nothing to do with it.
−0.01 −0.47 −0.23 0.34 −0.01 0.62
It is impossible for me to believe that luck plays an important role in
my life.
−0.01 −0.47 −0.01 0.12 −0.12 0.69
It is impossible for me to believe that luck plays an important role in
my life.
−0.07 −0.39 0.02 0.10 −0.18 0.62
In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. −0.03 −0.39 −0.12 0.26 0.04 0.43
In most cases, I do not depend on luck when I decide to do something. −0.05 −0.26 −0.12 0.20 0.00 0.38
I feel that when I make a mistake, there’s very little I can do to
correct it.
0.18 0.24 0.55 −0.25 0.24 0.65
I often feel powerless when dealing with the problems of life. 0.15 0.18 0.55 −0.15 0.32 0.62
Every time I try to make progress, something or somebody stops me. 0.12 0.31 0.54 −0.22 0.16 0.67
When something bad happens, I feel nothing can be done about it. 0.18 0.21 0.52 −0.25 0.43 0.61
Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction
my life is taking.
0.14 0.18 0.50 −0.13 0.27 0.68
There’s really nothing one can do to change one’s health, since a person
has no control over what happens to his or her health.
0.28 0.26 0.46 −0.18 0.23 0.61
If someone was not destined to succeed, no matter how much effort
they give, they will not succeed.
0.30 0.32 0.45 −0.37 0.15 0.58
There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have. 0.05 0.14 0.45 −0.24 0.19 0.58
I see bad things happening in my future. −0.02 0.13 0.43 −0.16 0.04 0.61
Unfortunately, no matter how hard we try, our worth frequently
passes unrecognized
0.14 0.14 0.41 −0.18 0.24 0.51
There’s nothing I can do to change the things I do not like in my work. 0.02 0.20 0.39 −0.17 0.07 0.56
If I take the right actions, I can stay healthy. −0.09 −0.13 −0.22 0.61 −0.13 0.69
I think that people can get what they want if they keep trying. −0.08 −0.23 −0.34 0.57 −0.01 0.55
When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it. −0.07 −0.14 −0.27 0.56 0.04 0.64
I am in control of my health. −0.22 −0.11 −0.19 0.51 −0.12 0.68
If I take care of myself, I can avoid illnesses. −0.12 −0.07 −0.17 0.51 −0.13 0.63
I think that planning is very important in determining a person’s future. −0.06 −0.21 −0.31 0.48 −0.10 0.60
In the long run people receive the respect and good outcomes they
worked for.
−0.02 −0.17 −0.29 0.46 0.18 0.59
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the divine control factor had the highest correlation with reli-
giosity, and the internality factor had its highest correlation
with the internality dimension of the ASQ. The correlations
with the ASQ were low, probably due in part to the low inter-
nal reliability of the criterion measure in this sample
(α=0.36). Discriminant validity was evidenced by lower cor-
relations between the scales and criterion variables with which
associations were not hypothesized. The fatalism factor was
not expected to correlate highly with any of these measures,
though it correlated significantly with all of them, most highly
with depression.
Finally, the associations between socioeconomic status, ac-
culturation, and the fatalism factors were tested. Socioeco-
nomic status did significantly correlate with the fatalism fac-
tors. The only factor to be correlated with acculturation was
internality (r=−0.13, p<0.01 with the Mexican Orientation
Scale and r=0.12, p<0.01 with the Anglo Orientation Scale).
Discussion
The factor structure of the study done by Esparza (2005) was
well-replicated in our study with items written specifically for
that purpose. Although some items had shared loadings, espe-
cially those on the fatalism factor, there were enough items per
factor to choose those that would provide distinct measure of
the constructs in question. Six items were selected for each
subscale to balance concision with internal reliability. The con-
firmatory factor analysis cross-validated the structure of the
fatalism measure in an independent sample, and there was
relatively little shrinkage in internal consistency upon cross-
validation. One-week test-retest reliabilities were acceptable,
except for the internality factor, which had an r=0.63.
The multidimensional fatalism measure developed has the
potential of bringing unity in the measurement of fatalism and
clarity in the findings. The developed scale is a reliable and
valid measure with good psychometric properties that can be
used interchangeably in English or in Spanish.
It seems clear that the first factor encompasses the core of
the fatalism construct as defined in the modern lexicon. It
reflects a tendency to view all events (whether positive or
negative) as fixed in advance and inevitable, while not neces-
sarily anticipating a particular outcome.
The second factor to emerge, labeled “helplessness,” is
similar in content to what Acevedo (2005a) refers to as struc-
tural fatalism. It reflects a pervasive pessimistic outlook and is
Table 1 (continued)
Time Factor loadings Communality
1 2 3 4 5 h2
My failures and successes are the direct result of my own behavior. −0.14 −0.22 −0.21 0.45 0.10 0.55
I have absolute control over what happens to me in my life. −0.31 0.01 −0.16 0.44 −0.15 0.59
People do not realize how much they can personally determine their
own outcomes in life.
−0.12 −0.13 −0.20 0.34 0.10 0.43
People’s misfortunes are the result of the mistakes they make. −0.10 −0.19 −0.12 0.31 0.02 0.53
My actions have a direct impact on things that happen to me. −0.12 −0.22 −0.30 0.30 0.06 0.57
There’s no sense in taking a lot of safety precautions, since what is going
to happen will happen no matter what you do.
0.25 0.22 0.40 −0.12 0.47 0.73
Life and death are entirely out of our control. 0.33 −0.09 0.03 0.03 0.46 0.63
If an accident is going to happen, there’s nothing you can do to prevent it. 0.32 0.07 0.19 −0.18 0.46 0.59
Life is written in a way that cannot be changed. 0.62 0.14 0.34 −0.28 0.43 0.78
Quite often one finds that what happens to people has no relation to
what they do. What happens just happens.
0.26 0.26 0.37 −0.17 0.42 0.64
People who accept their circumstances in life are happier than those who
try to change things.
0.13 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.38 0.53
People should focus on the present, since the future is completely out
of our hands.
0.27 0.10 0.27 −0.08 0.38 0.59
A person’s future is determined the moment he or she is born. 0.61 0.14 0.34 −0.23 0.37 0.72
The secret of happiness is not to expect too much out of life, and to be
content with what life brings you.
0.22 0.16 0.25 −0.05 0.36 0.56
People are happier when they don’t think about the future too much. 0.10 0.25 0.27 −0.13 0.33 0.49
If I am destined to stay healthy, I will stay healthy. 0.46 0.22 0.25 −0.13 0.26 0.58
When something bad happens, I accept it as unavoidable. 0.08 0.11 0.21 −0.02 0.26 0.50
I think that problems are solved on their own if you don’t worry
about them.
0.18 0.25 0.38 −0.19 0.11 0.57
First items with bolded loadings are the items retained for the fatalism measure
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Table 2 Items selected for the




1. Everything that happens is part of God’s plan.
2. Everything that happens to a person was planned
by God.
3. Whatever happens to me in my life, it is because
that is the way God wanted it to happen.
4. God controls everything good and bad that
happens to a person.
5. God has a plan for each person, and you cannot
change his plan.
6. No matter how much effort I invest into doing
things, at the end, God’s decisions will prevail.
Control divino
1. Todo lo que sucede es parte del plan de Dios.
2. Todo lo que le pasa a una persona fue planeado por
Dios.
3. Cualquier cosa que me pase en la vida, es porque así
quería Dios que pasara.
4. Dios controla todo lo bueno y lo malo que le sucede a
una persona.
5. Dios tiene un plan para cada persona, y usted no
puede cambiar su plan.
6. Por mucho esfuerzo que yo invierta en hacer las
cosas, al final, la decisión de Dios prevalecerá.–
Luck
1. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m
lucky.
2. How successful people are in their job is related to
how lucky they are.
3. Some people are simply born being lucky.
4. When good things happen to people, it is because
of good luck.
5. The really good things that happen to me are
mostly because of luck.
6. Luck does not exist
Suerte
1. Cuando obtengo lo que quiero es usualmente es
porque tengo suerte.
2. El grado de éxito que tienen las personas en su trabajo
está relacionado con la cantidad de suerte que tienen.
3. Alguna gente simplemente nace siendo suertuda.
4. Cuando le pasan cosas buenas a la gente, es por
buena suerte.
5. Las cosas realmente buenas que me pasan son
generalmente por suerte.
6. No existe la suerte.
Helplessness
1. I feel that nothing I can do will change things.
2. Sometimes I feel there is nothing to look forward
to in the future.
3. I feel that I do not have any control over the things
that happen to me.
4. No matter how hard I try, I still cannot succeed in
life.
5. I often feel overwhelmed with problems, since I do
not have any control over solving these problems.
6. There’s nothing I can do to succeed in life, since
one’s level of success is determined when one is
born.
Desesperanza
1. Siento que nada de lo que yo pueda hacer cambiará
las cosas.
2. A veces siento que no hay nada que esperar del
futuro.
3. Yo siento que no tengo ningún control sobre las cosas
que me pasan.
4. No importa qué tanto me esfuerce, todavía no puedo
triunfar en la vida.
5. Con frecuencia me siento abrumado con problemas,
ya que no tengo ningún control sobre la resolución de
estos problemas.
6. No hay nada que yo pueda hacer para tener éxito en la
vida, pues el nivel de éxito está determinado cuando
uno nace.
Internality
1. I feel that when good things happen, they happen
as a result of my own efforts.
2. What happens to me in the future mostly depends
on me.
3. My life is determined by my own actions.
4. What people get out of life is always due to the
amount of effort they put into it.
5.What happens to me is a consequence of what I do.
6. I can do almost anything if I really want to do it.
Internalidad
1. Siento que cuando pasan cosas buenas, suceden
como resultado de mis propios esfuerzos.
2. Lo que me pase a mí en el futuro depende
mayormente de mí.
3. Mi vida está determinada por mis propias acciones.
4. Lo que la gente obtiene de la vida es siempre debido a
la cantidad de esfuerzo que le dedican.
5. Lo que me pasa a mí es consecuencia de lo yo haga.
6. Puedo hacer casi cualquier cosa si realmente quiero
hacerlo.
Fatalism
1. I have learned that what is going to happen will
happen.
2. If something bad is going to happen to me, it will
happen no matter what I do.
Fatalismo
1. He aprendido que lo que tiene que pasar, pasará.
2. Si algomalo me va a pasar, pasará sin importar lo que
haga.
3. Si pasan cosas malas, es porque así tenían que pasar.
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strongly linked to depression. However, in psychology this
construct has its own rich literature separate from work on
fatalism (e.g., Seligman 1975) and has been most frequently
studied in the context of psychopathology, rather than normal




3. If bad things happen, it is because they were meant
to happen.
4. There is no sense in planning a lot; if something
good is going to happen, it will.
5. Life is very unpredictable, and there is nothing one
can do to change the future.
6. People die when it is their time to die and there is
not much that can be done about it.
4. No tiene sentido hacer muchos planes; si algo bueno
va a pasar, pasará.
5. La vida es muy imprevisible, y no hay nada que uno
pueda hacer para cambiar el futuro.
6. La gente se muere cuando es su tiempo de morir y no
hay mucho que se pueda hacer al respecto.
Table 3 Factor loadings and
uniquenesses of confirmatory
factor analysis and model with all
parameters constrained to
equality
Item Factor loadings Uniqueness
Fatalism Helplessness Internality Luck Divine control
FAT1 0.74 (0.72) 0.45 (0.49)
FAT2 0.37 (0.38) 0.86 (0.85)
FAT3 0.69 (0.72) 0.53 (0.48)
FAT4 0.66 (0.62) 0.56 (0.62)
FAT5 0.50 (0.50) 0.75 (0.75)
FAT6 0.62 (0.65) 0.61 (0.58)
HEL1 0.52 (0.57) 0.73 (0.67)
HEL2 0.71 (0.74) 0.49 (0.45)
HEL3 0.74 (0.75) 0.46 (0.44)
HEL4 0.53 (0.55) 0.72 (0.69)
HEL5 0.54 (0.57) 0.71 (0.67)
HEL6 0.41 (0.48) 0.83 (0.77)
INT1 0.69 (0.71) 0.52 (0.50)
INT2 0.62 (0.68) 0.61 (0.54)
INT3 0.62 (0.60) 0.61 (0.64)
INT4 0.56 (0.55) 0.69 (0.70)
INT5 0.63 (0.61) 0.61 (0.63)
INT6 0.64 (0.61) 0.60 (0.62)
LUC1 0.71 (0.73) 0.50 (0.47)
LUC2 0.69 (0.67) 0.52 (0.56)
LUC3 0.73 (0.77) 0.47 (0.40)
LUC4 0.42 (0.48) 0.82 (0.77)
LUC5 0.71 (0.74) 0.50 (0.45)
LUC6 0.72 (0.72) 0.48 (0.49)
DIV1 0.82 (0.86) 0.32 (0.26)
DIV2 0.87 (0.87) 0.24 (0.23)
DIV3 0.72 (0.76) 0.48 (0.43)
DIV4 0.85 (0.86) 0.28 (0.26)
DIV5 0.79 (0.80) 0.37 (0.36)
DIV6 0.79 (0.80) 0.38 (0.35)
Values in parenthesis are values of the model with all parameters constrained to equality. FAT Fatalism, HEL
Helplessness, INT Internality, LUC Luck, DIV Divine control
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The divine control factor is similar to the concept of cos-
mological fatalism that Acevedo proposes, and also reflects
secondary control expectations, as defined by Morling and
Evered (2006). However, this factor was the least well corre-
lated with the others, and virtually uncorrelated with
helplessness and internality. Content of the items, while
reflecting a strong belief in divine intervention, did not
generally make reference to predetermination of events. The
strong internal consistency of the factor suggests that belief in
divine control is an important variable in its own right, and the
present results suggest that it should be measured separately
from fatalism. Indeed, work such as that by Wallston et al.
(1999) has advanced the study of divine control beliefs.
Even further removed from the core construct of fatalism
are the factors of luck and internality. The existing conceptu-
alizations of luck in the psychological literature have ranged
from that of a random and unpredictable variable (e.g., Weiner
1974) to a relatively stable individual difference (e.g., Darke
and Freedman 1997; Wagenaar and Keren 1988). Items load-
ing on the current luck factor reflect these two extremes, from
“To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happen-
ings,” to “Some people are just born lucky.” However, again
this literature has developed independently of work on
fatalism (e.g., Pritchard and Smith 2004) and may be best
identified as a separate domain.
As for internality, it is perhaps surprising that this fac-
tor emerged distinctly from the other four factors and had
the lowest correlation with the core fatalism factor. Multi-
ple researchers in the past have assumed that low internal
locus of control is indicative of high fatalism (Cole et al.
1978; De Brabander, et al. 1999; Joiner, et al. 2001).
However, the present results suggest that the two concepts
do not necessarily define opposite ends of a single
dimension.
Of the five factors proposed by Esparza (2005), the first
and largest factor is the only one that is not already well
established under a different name in the “nomological net”
of psychological constructs, with a corresponding supportive
literature. We believe that this reflects the fact that this factor
best defines the concept of “fatalism,” and should be the pri-
mary target of future fatalism research. It is essential that re-
searchers define more clearly the nature of the variable they
wish to study when conducting work on fatalism. Indeed, it is
possible that diversity in previous measures of fatalism might
help explain the inconsistency across existing studies of the
construct.
Table 4 Correlation between
factors measured with the
multidimensional fatalism
measure
Factors Ineluctable destiny Helplessness Internality Luck Divine control
Ineluctable destiny –
Helplessness 41 –
Internality −0.15 −0.36 –
Luck 0.25 0.31 −0.18 –
Divine control 0.50 0.18 −0.21 0.10 –
All correlations were significant at p< 0.01
Table 5 Fit indices for nested models across english and spanish fatalism forms
Model SBχ2 df ΔSBχ2 a NNFI RMSEA CFI ΔCFI a NFI GFI SRMR
Confirmatory factor analysis (English sample) 728.88** 395 – 0.97 0.04 0.9762 – 0.95 0.96 0.05
Confirmatory factor analysis (Spanish sample) 538.88** 395 – 0.98 0.04 0.9807 – 0.93 0.95 0.06
1. Configural invariance (Number of factors and items in same
factors)
1255.93** 790 – 0.98 0.04 0.9782 – 0.94 0.95 0.06
2. Metric invariance (Loadings) 1276.29** 815 23.13 0.98 0.04 0.9784 −0.0002 0.94 0.95 0.07
3. Scalar invariance (Intercepts) 1368.70** 845 113.04** 0.97 0.04 0.9755 0.0027 0.94 0.94 0.07
4. Strictc factorial invariance (error/uniqueness) 1425.69** 875 165.81** 0.97 0.04 0.9743 0.0039 0.94 0.94 0.08
5. Structural invariance (Factor variances and covariances) 1454.55** 890 196.88** 0.97 0.04 0.9736 0.0046 0.93 0.93 0.09
5. Structural invariance—evaluation of factor means 1397.46** 885 142.70** 0.98 0.04 0.9760 0.0022 0.94 0.94 0.08
SBχ2 Satorra-Bentler χ2 , df degrees of freedom,ΔSBχ2 difference in SBχ2 between baseline model (configural invariance) and nested models, NNFI
non-normed fit index, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, CFI comparative fit index, ΔCFI difference in CFI between baseline model
(configural invariance) and nested models, NFI norm fit index, GFI goodness of fit index, SRMR standardized root mean squared residual
– value not calculated
a Nested models were compared to Model 1
** p < 0.01
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This is the first report of measurement invariance data from
an instrument developed simultaneously in two languages.
Following the guidelines by Tanzer (2005), simultaneous de-
velopment in English and Spanish resulted in a decentered
instrument that is invariant across language in its factor struc-
ture, loadings, item intercepts, item uniqueness, and factor
variances and covariances. Indeed, the highly consistent re-
sults of the language comparisons are atypical in the measure-
ment invariance literature, lending support to the simultaneous
development approach.
Once measurement invariance was established and latent
mean differences were evaluated, there were significant dif-
ferences between the English and Spanish samples on all of
the factors, except for helplessness. However, although the
differences were statistically significant, none of them
exceeded one point on a scale from 6 to 30. The greatest
difference (on the fatalism factor) was two-tenths of one point,
there does not appear to be a practically significant effect of
language on latent means.
The convergent and discriminant analyses shows how
the five related but distinct factors behave differently with
other constructs. Each factor, except for the internality
factor, correlated strongly and uniquely with its designated
construct in the hypothesized manner. However, other cor-
relations varied not only in magnitude, but also in direc-
tion, depending on the factor under consideration. For ex-
ample, while religiosity correlated positively with divine
control and fatalism, it was negatively associated with
the luck factor. Past studies in which these factors have
been conflated in a single fatalism measure have been
unable to detect such subtleties.
Although the majority of the current sample was His-
panic (86.2 %) this may not have greatly impacted the
factor structure identified. Cole et al. (1978), compared
fatalistic attitudes of Mexicans and Chicanos with partici-
pants from the US, Ireland, and West Germany, and found
no difference in fatalism indicators. Future directions in-
clude analyzing the factor structure of the fatalism mea-
sure in other populations that are not college students,
with other ethnic groups, with different age groups, in
different parts of the country or other countries.
One limitation of this study is that there was no control for
Type 1 error since there were numerous analyses done with
the data. While explicit directional hypotheses were stated in
most cases, there remains the possibility that some bivariate
associations in the current study may have been exaggerated
due to unique sample characteristics. Also, due to concern
about overburdening student participants, no health measures
could be included in this study to analyze their relationships
with the fatalism factors. For future studies, another internality
instrument should be used to compare it to the internality
factor of the scale. Even though the highest correlation of
the internality factor was with the ASQ, the correlation was
not strong (r=0.24) since the internality dimension of the
ASQ had a poor internal consistency (α=0.36).
The present study contributes to the clarification of
the constructs that have been assessed in past research
on fatalism. The new measure of fatalism and related
constructs may further advance understanding in the do-
main. We propose to use the fatalism factor of this
measure to analyze the relationship between fatalism
and other behaviors. The other four factors (helpless-
ness, internality, luck, and divine control), even though
some have used to measure fatalism, they should be
analyzed separately and not to be confused with fatal-
ism. For example, a study reports a significant correla-
tion of r= 0.19 between fatalism and a cardio-metabolic
dysfunction score (Espinosa and Gallo 2013). They use
a fatalism measure from Cuéllar et al. (1995a)b that include
the following items: “People can’t really do much to change
what happens in life. You just have to accept things”, “It’s
more important to enjoy life now than to plan for the
Table 6 Correlation between factors of the multidimensional fatalism measure, internal reliability, and assessment of convergent and discriminant
validity
Factors FA HE IN LU DC LOT-R ASQ BIGL PHQ-9 DRI
Fatalism (FA) 0.76 −0.17** −0.10** 0.11** 0.20** 0.15**
Helplessness (HE) 0.41** 0.76 −0.49** −0.09* 0.02 0.40** −0.04
Internality (IN) −0.15** −0.36** 0.80 0.14** 0.24** 0.01 −0.06 −0.09*
Luck (LU) 0.25** 0.31** −0.18** 0.82 −0.09* −0.10** 0.60** 0.05 −0.11**
Divine control (DC) 0.50** 0.18** −0.21** 0.10** 0.92 0.06 −0.05 0.05 −0.01 0.57**
LOT-R Life Orientation Test—Revised (optimism), ASQAttributional Style Questionnaire— internality scale, BIGLBelief in Good Luck Scale, PHQ-9
Patient Health Questionnaire (depression), DRI Duke Religion Index (religiosity)
Correlations in bold are the correlations expected to reflect convergent validity
Values in diagonal and italics are internal consistencies of each factor measured by Cronbach’s alpha
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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future”, “I live for today because I don’t know what will
happen in the future”, “I don’t plan ahead because most
things in life are a matter of luck”. According to our find-
ings, the only item that reflects the construct of fatalism is
the first one, but in the Cuéllar fatalism measure all of these
items are included in their fatalism factor. If the same anal-
ysis was done using our scale, then the relationship between
fatalism and cardio-metabolic dysfunction would be more
precise. Also the other four factors of our scale could be
correlated to analyze those relationships, which are differ-
ent from fatalism.
This measure may be used to test theoretical associations
between the proposed constructs and important health behav-
iors. There are several studies in which fatalism has been
related to health behaviors. Some examples include cardio-
metabolic dysfunction (Espinosa and Gallo 2013), cancer
screening (Espinosa and Gallo 2011), HIVand AIDS preven-
tion (Gwandure and Mayekiso 2012), protective sun behav-
iors (Coups et al. 2014), and adherence to highly active anti-
retroviral therapy (Vyas et al. 2014). We expect to have more
exact results using this scale in health related behavior studies
since it has a factor that is purported to measure specifically
the fatalism factor without having items that represent other
constructs like luck, helplessness, divine control or internality.
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